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THE INTERNATIONAL ENERGY PROGRAM:
AN ASSESSMENT*
JOHN F. MURPHY**
The OPEC oil embargo of 1973-74 produced disastrous
economic repercussions throughout the world. In response, a
number of oil consuming countries created the International
Energy Program in order to achieve cooperative, world-wide
control of energy. In this Article, Dean Murphy analyzes the IEP
and its implementation, particularly in the United States. The
author concludes that because the number of countries partici-
pating in the program is small and most refuse to alter energy
consumption at the domestic level, no global system of interna-
tional cooperation on energy is in sight.
Although oil has been an object of international trade since the
latter part of the 19th century, until very recently it has not been
subject to international regulation. Indeed, the traditional pat-
tern was that of laissez-faire; even at the domestic level, govern-
mental regulation of oil companies was minimal.
However, following World War II, the governments of oil ex-
porting countries substantially increased their involvement in the
petroleum industry. Increased involvement led these countries to
conclude that they had a common interest in maintaining the
price of oil at a high level. To achieve this goal, they formed the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Despite
this ominous development, the oil importing countries failed to
take meaningful steps toward a counterpoise until OPEC im-
posed the oil embargo of 1973-74. In the wake of the oil embargo,
the industrial countries established a framework for international
cooperation regarding energy, namely, the International Energy
Program (IEP).
* This article is an expanded version of remarks delivered by the author to a symposium
on "Energy, International Resources and Controls." The remarks were delivered at a
regional meeting of the American Society of International Law held on December 4, 1975,
at the DePaul University College of Law.
** Associate Dean and Professor of Law, University of Kansas; B.A., LL.B., Cornell
University. Member of the Kansas and Washington, D.C.. Bars. The author would like to
express his appreciation for the able research assistance of Janet E. Roberts, a third-year
student at the University of Kansas Law School.
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International concern over energy focused almost exclusively
on the petroleum market and on the international oil companies
involved in its operations. Because of the view of most experts
that the world community will be heavily dependent upon petro-
leum over the next decade or so for its energy needs, current
attention has been focused on possible steps for ensuring an ade-
quate supply of this vital resource. At the same time, extensive,
less publicized, efforts toward international cooperation with re-
spect to the development of alternative energy sources have been
undertaken.' In this regard, substantially greater efforts are envi-
sioned by the IEP for the future.
The IEP is only one facet of the immensely complicated subject
of energy resources, which is itself but one issue in the world
community's current debate on a "new international economic
order." There are those who question whether there should be
any international cooperation regarding energy resources. There
are also those who advocate that the problems should be left to
the free market's law of supply and demand or to national con-
trols by governments exercising their "permanent sovereignty
over natural resources." However, as will be developed in this
Article, because IEP membership is limited only to the major
industrialized countries, global influence in affecting the utiliza-
tion of energy resources has been minimal.
.In addition to energy questions, the world community is strug-
gling with such issues as the removal of tariff and other barriers
to international trade, monetary problems, the indexation of raw
materials prices, the stabilization of production and prices of raw
materials, the transfer of technology, and the proper role of trans-
national corporations. Meaningful international cooperation with
respect to energy resources may depend upon the world com-
munity's success in coping with these other issues. Moreover,
international cooperation concerning energy or other natural re-
sources is inextricably intertwined with measures adopted at the
domestic level. Failure to take effective measures at the domestic
level may destroy international cooperation in these matters.
1. See generally Pollack & Congdon, International Cooperation in Energy Research and
Development, 6 LAW & POL. INT'L Bus. 677 (1974).
2. For a description of this debate, see Haight, The New International Economic Order
and the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, 9 INT'L LAw. 591 (1975).
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Except for a consideration of domestic actions taken by the
United States to fulfill its obligations under the IEP, this Article
will refer only parenthetically to these larger issues. The primary
purpose will be to examine the IEP from a critical perspective in
order to describe and assess the operation of the program. Also,
this Article analyzes the IEP from the perspective of United
States interests. This is not to say that no reference will be made
to the interests of other countries. On the contrary, an under-
standing of the interests of other members of the world com-
munity in energy resources is indispensable to a determination of
United States interests. As an aid to understanding, the major
historical developments prior to the adoption of the International
Energy Program must be reviewed.
I. THE INTERNATIONAL ENERGY PROGRAM: A BRIEF BACKGROUND
At the turn of the century, the United States and Russia domi-
nated the world petroleum market, together producing more than
ninety percent of the world's oil.3 Prior to 1900, however, no
United States oil companies were involved in the foreign
production of oil, and by 1914, United States companies had
acquired producing properties only in Mexico and Romania,
which accounted for only fifteen percent of the total crude oil
output outside the United States.'
Prior to World War I, entry by United States firms into the
foreign oil market was hampered severely by British, Dutch, and
French domination of the Middle East and other areas. World
War I highlighted the undesirability of this situation. The war
and the advent of the gasoline-powered automobile created a sub-
stantial drain on United States oil resources and precipitated
fears about the adequacy of domestic reserves. As a result, the
United States government encouraged intensified efforts by
American companies to develop foreign sources.
The breakthrough came in 1929 when, in spite of strong British
opposition, an agreement was made admitting Exxon, Mobil,
Gulf, Atlantic, and Standard Oil of Indiana as participants in the
3. Most of this discussion of historical background is taken from R. KRUEGER, THE
UNITED STATES AND INTERNATIONAL OIL (1975) and N. JACOBY, MULTINATIONAL OIL (1974).
4. N. JACOBY, supra note 3, at 26.
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Iraqi concession held by the Turkish Petroleum Company, known
after 1929 as Iraq Petroleum Company. Further inroads were
made by United States companies into the Middle East as well
as into other areas of the world up to the advent of World War
II.,
These inroads lead to significantly increased oil production in
such areas as Venezuela, Iran, Iraq, and the Orient. Additionally,
major increases in oil production in the United States helped
dispel the fears of an oil shortage that arose after World War I
and created, instead, concern regarding overproduction of petro-
leum. By way of response to this concern, in December 1924,
President Coolidge created the Federal Oil Conservation Board,
whose mandate was to investigate and recommend various meth-
ods of petroleum conservation. Simultaneously, the domestic oil
industry began to prorate production on a voluntary basis.
In spite of these developments, by 1929 problems of overprod-
uction had become so acute that a committee of the American
Petroleum Institute recommended that average production
should be held to 1928 levels. The Institute also decided to study
the problem of overproduction in depth, not only in the United
States but throughout the world. However, because of antitrust
laws, inter-company agreements on production levels could not
be used to solve the problem. Consequently, the oil companies
sought authorization to do so from the Federal Oil Conservation
Board. The Board refused to grant authorization on the ground
that such authority is reserved solely to the states.7
Rebuffed at the federal level, the oil companies pleaded their
case to the states. These efforts resulted in the Interstate Oil
Compact, a cooperative agreement among the oil producing
states. The Compact established a commission whose function
was to estimate the demand for domestic production and to deter-
mine whether the demand could be met without physical waste.
Actual authority to prorate production was left to individual state
agencies. With the enactment of state prorating laws, a compre-
hensive system for conserving oil, preventing wasteful practices,
5. Id. at 28-37.
6. R. KRUEGER, supra note 3, at 46.
7. Id. at 44-45.
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and maintaining petroleum prices through the prevention of pro-
duction surpluses was created.'
In addition to these efforts at the domestic level, the major oil
companies with world markets sought to maintain world petro-
leum prices and established market shares. For example, in 1928
they negotiated the so-called "As Is Agreement" which commit-
ted the companies to avoid overproduction and "destructive com-
petition" in established markets. Although the antitrust laws
made such an agreement among domestic producers illegal, U.S.
companies conducted their international activities largely un-
impeded by antitrust considerations? However, none of these
measures was entirely successful. New discoveries of oil, both
within the United States and in foreign countries, continued to
create surpluses and to weaken market prices.
World War II significantly affected the oil industry. Foreign oil
companies came under the control of governments, the industry's
structure was frozen, and there were no important new entrants.
At the end of the war, the oil export potential of the United States
had passed its peak, and the most important foreign sources of
oil were the Carribean and the Middle East. The war also brought
to an end British and French domination of the Middle East.
At the end of World War II, the world oil market was domi-
nated almost exclusively by the so-called "Seven Sisters," the
seven largest oil companies in the world, which together ac-
counted for approximately ninety-two percent of the ownership of
world crude oil reserves and eighty-eight percent of the world
production of crude oil."0 Five of the seven-Exxon, Gulf, Mobil,
Standard Oil of California, and Texaco-were American owned.
The remaining two, Royal/Shell and British Petroleum, had a
predominantly non-American ownership. Each of these compa-
nies, with a myriad of branches and subsidiaries around the
world, was integrated in its operations. They engaged in explor-
ing, producing, transporting, and marketing refined petroleum
products. Governmental control over the operations of these com-
panies, prior to the end of World War II, was minimal. Although
8. Id. at 45.
9. Id.
10. N. JACOBY, supra note 3, at 289.
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most countries retained title to underground petroleum resources,
such ownership was of little practical significance. Through their
domination of host country governments, the oil companies ob-
tained concessions that covered large areas, were of long duration,
and vested the development of a country's oil resources in one or
a few oil companies with established marketing organizations.
Under the concession agreements, the companies were given wide
authority to explore, develop, produce, and market petroleum. In
return, the companies made relatively modest royalty and tax
payments to the host governments.
However, World War II was the watershed. When it ended, the
non-communist world, with the exception of the United States,
moved rapidly from a laissez-faire era to one characterized by
active government participation in or control of the world oil
market. National governments increasingly concluded that na-
tional policies concerning petroleum were too important to be left
to the international oil companies. A primary factor in this
change in attitude was the breakup of the British, Dutch, and
French empires, with the consequent creation of dozens of new
nations. Dramatic advances in education, communications, and
travel precipitated an awareness on the part of these nations of
the importance of petroleum in economic growth and security and
of a need to take an active involvement in the establishment of
national oil policies.
National regulation of oil production proliferated, encouraging
competition among oil companies. Under newly enacted general
petroleum laws concerning concessions, the area conceded to any
one firm was sharply limited, the duration of concessions was
shortened, and the taking on of local partners was often required.
Increasingly, governments declined to grant concessions and in-
stead engaged foreign firms to explore for and develop oil produc-
tion as government contractors. The net result of these policies
was to increase competition among would-be concessionaires or
government contractors in nearly every oil producing country.
Another development after World War II favorable to the
growth of competition in the petroleum industry was a progres-
sive relaxation, with some notable exceptions, of government con-
trols on international trade. Included were the reduction or elimi-
nation of currency controls, tariff barriers, and such quantitative
restrictions on trade as import quotas. The most important and
[Vol. 26:595
ENERGY PROGRAM
conspicuous exception to this development was the quota system
on oil imports imposed by the United States government, first in
1957, on a "voluntary" basis and later, in 1959, on a mandatory
basis." This highly controversial program was adopted in re-
sponse to increasing imports of lower priced foreign crude oils
which had threatened to nullify the operation of the prorationing
laws under which American states attempted to sustain high
domestic petroleum prices. At the domestic level, the program
had been criticized by economists for its anticompetitive effects
in nullifying the supply/demand relationship to price and pre-
venting surpluses from driving prices lower. Paradoxically, the
program had the opposite effect in the foreign oil market. By
limiting the growth of imports, the effect of the quotas was to
separate the United States oil market from the rest of the world
and increase significantly the amount of crude oil available to the
rest of the non-communist world. This further intensified compe-
tition in foreign markets and depressed foreign oil prices. The
United States oil import quota program continued in effect
through the 1960's, although quotas were gradually relaxed to
permit rising imports. The level of imports rose rapidly after
United States oil production peaked out in 1970 and resulted in
the removal of oil import quotas altogether in 1973.
In situations not involving expropriation or nationalization, the
incomes of private oil companies were subjected to increased for-
eign government levies after World War II. Saudi Arabia, Ku-
wait, Iraq, Qatar, Bahrain, and Iran all introduced taxation for-
mulas with 50 percent rates in the 1950's. These rates were cou-
pled with rapidly escalating royalty payments as well.'" During
this period, oil generally moved at posted prices, on which the
profit margin was calculated for tax purposes, and these prices
rose along with rising crude prices in the United States. Conse-
quently, the government's per barrel share of revenue rose as well.
This process continued until the United States mandatory Oil
Import Quota Program and other factors led to an oversupply
situation, a reduction in posted prices by the oil companies in
11. Id. at 105.
12. Id. at 107; Jensen, International Oil-Shortage,.Cartel or Emerging Resource
Monopoly?, 7 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 335, 341 (1974).
19771
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
1959 and 1960, and a consequent reduction in government royalty
and tax payments. In response to this reduction in their per-
barrel share of revenue, the producing countries banded together
to form the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC), with the express purpose to "restore crude oil prices to
the level which prevailed prior to August 9, 1960 . .'" Al-
though OPEC was unable to restore posted prices by 1970, it was
able to restore most of the 1959 and 1960 reductions in revenue
per barrel takes through measures which had the net effect of
increasing the tax rate to a split of close to 75/25.'1
With the increase in the number of private oil enterprises that
followed World War II, and the consequent invigoration of com-
petition, the price of oil was low. This low price allowed petro-
leum to enlarge its role as a source of energy at the expense of
coal. Between 1949 and 1972, oil usage rose from fifteen to fifty-
seven percent of total energy consumption in Western Europe,
and from thirty-nine to sixty-two percent in the rest of the foreign
non-communist world."5 With this switch to oil, United States
dependence on imported energy rose to fourteen percent of energy
consumption in 1972.16 Western Europe's dependence on the im-
port of oil grew from the thirty-three percent in 1960 to sixty-five
percent in 1972. Japan's dependence rose from forty-three to
ninety percent during the same period. 7 The year 1973 revealed
the full power of OPEC to turn this increased dependence to its
advantage. At that time, the members of OPEC agreed to a quad-
rupling in the price of oil, as well as to cutbacks in oil production.
The Arab oil-producing states also instituted an embargo on oil
shipments to the United States and the Netherlands because of
United States support of Israel in the Middle East crisis.
The impact of these OPEC actions on the world community
was traumatic. On the average, member countries in the Organi-
zation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) ex-
perienced a fourteen percent inflation rate in 1974, about a
13. Jensen, supra note 12, at 343.
14. Id.
15. N. JACOBY, supra note 3, at 290.
16. Enders, OPEC and the Industrial Countries: The Next Ten Years, 53 FoRF IGN Am.
624 (1975).
17. Id.
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quarter of which was attributable to the quadrupling of oil
prices." The 1973-74 oil embargo also precipitated industrial dis-
location, balance of payments problems, and unemployment,
thus contributing to a major recession in the OECD countries.
While the quadrupling of oil prices created substantial hard-
ship for OECD countries, the impact on developing countries of
the so-called Third or Fourth Worlds was catastrophic. The in-
crease in oil prices added about $8.5 billion to the cost of imports
of the developing countries in 1974, with paralyzing effect on
many economies." In many instances the higher prices meant less
fuel to run irrigation pumps supplying water to fields. Higher
prices also caused shortages of fertilizer for crops, resulting in a
decrease in food production in countries where severe malnutri-
tion was already rampant. Some Third World balance of pay-
ments problems became so severe as to raise the risk of default
on their international debts.
During the crisis, the OECD countries largely reacted on an
individual basis and failed to maintain a united front. Although
the OECD had agreed earlier on a rudimentary scheme for the
sharing of oil among members in the event of a crisis, activation
of the plan depended upon unanimity among members. Such
unanimity was not forthcoming. On the contrary, several mem-
bers sought preferential treatment from the oil producing coun-
tries. By contrast, OPEC members maintained tight control over
prices and relatively tight control over production levels. 0
In an effort to develop a comprehensive framework for coopera-
tion among the industrialized countries, the United States con-
vened a conference on energy matters. Thirteen industrialized
countries attended the conference in Washington, D.C." This led
to the establishment of the International Energy Agency (IEA)
and to the signing by sixteen (now nineteen) countries" of the
18. Id.
19. Wall St. J., Sept. 8, 1975, at 10, col. 4.
20. See Lantzke, The OECD and its International Energy Agency, DAEDALUS 217 (Fall
1975).
21. For the text of the communique issued by the Washington Energy Conference, see
13 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 462 (1974).
22. These 16 states included: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Since the time of the
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Agreement on an International Energy Program. 3 The Agree-
ment sets forth the details of the Program and the institutional
structure of IEA, through which the Program is to be imple-
mented.
In a separate agreement, but as an integral part of the Interna-
tional Energy Program, the OECD also established a Financial
Support Fund designed "to serve for a limited period, in view of
current economic conditions, to supplement, in exceptional cases,
other sources of credit to which members encountering serious
economic difficulties have had recourse."24
U1. THE INTERNATIONAL ENERGY PROGRAM AND UNITED STATES
LAW: A CONSPECTUS
The IEP contains many detailed provisions that ultimately
might form the basis for a cooperative, global system for energy
control. The Program provides for participating countries to have
emergency oil reserves and a commitment to limited oil use in
time of emergency. The Program also provides for financial sup-
port and a free exchange of information. Examination of how
participating countries, particularly the United States, are im-
plementing the IEP provisions casts doubt on whether the IEP
can achieve a global system of energy control.
Emergency Oil Reserves, Demand Restraint,
and Oil-Sharing Arrangements
Not surprisingly, a "first objective" of the industrialized coun-
tries in creating the International Energy Program was "the de-
velopment of a capability to deal with future supply interruptions
in a cooperative framework."25 To this end the Program focuses
on ensuring an emergency self-sufficiency in oil supplies. Each
signing, Greece and New Zealand have become members and Norway has become an
associate member.
23. Agreement on an International Energy Program, Nov. 18, 1974, [hereinafter re-
ferred to as the IEP]. See 14 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1-35 (1975).
24. Art. 1, §(1)(b) of the Agreement Establishing a Financial Support Fund. The text
of the Agreement may be found at 14 INr'L LEGAL MATERIALS 979 (1975).
25. Enders, The International Energy Program and U.S. Obligations as a Member of
the International Energy Agency, 72 DEP'T STATE BULL. 307, 308 (March 10, 1975).
[Vol. 26:595
19771 ENERGY PROGRAM
participating country"6 is to have an "emergency reserve commit-
ment," an obligation to maintain oil reserves sufficient to sustain
consumption" for ninety days, 8 without net imports.29 However,
the President and the Congress have been slow in implementing
the Strategic Petroleum Reserve program. As of the date of this
writing, the United States is the only major industrialized nation
that does not have strategic oil storage."
Under the International Energy Program, either a general sup-
ply emergency affecting the group as a whole or an individual
supply shortage would activate provisions for the allocation of oil
among participating countries. In a general crisis, when the group
26. This term is used throughout the Agreement to denote both states to which the
Agreement applies provisionally and states for which it has entered into force. The IEP is
to be applied provisionally from November 18, 1971 by all signatory states to the extent
not inconsistent with their legislation. IEP §68. Provisional application of the IEP by a
signatory state may terminate in one of three ways: by entry into force for a signatory state
which has notified the depository (Belgium) of its consent to be bound; after notification
by a signatory state that it does not consent to be bound; or if the time limit for
notification (May 1, 1975) has expired (unless the time limit has been extended by deci-
sion of the Governing Board). IEP art. 68, §(2). The IEP entered into force definitively
for the United States on January 19, 1976. As of December 9, 1976, the Agreement is still
provisionally in force for Italy, Turkey, Greece and New Zealand.
27. As measured by the average daily level of the previous year.
28. IEP art. 2, para. 2.
29. This reserve commitment can be satisfied by emergency stocks of oil, standby oil
production facilities, or by the capacity to switch in an emergency from oil to other sources
of energy, as defined in articles 1, 2, and 4 of the Annex to the IEP. Under this approach,
it has been estimated that stocks of oil available to the 19 member countries of the Agency
range from 70 days' worth of imports to 160 days' worth for the United States. N.Y. Times,
Oct. 8, 1976, at D3, col. 1. At the same time, the International Energy Agency has under
review the OECD definition of stocks, to determine whether it offers adequate criteria for
measuring absolutely unavailable stocks. Enders, supra note 25, at 308.
30. N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 1976, at 1, col. 5. In a related matter, if the participating
countries sustain, or can reasonably be expected to sustain, a reduction in the daily rate
of oil supplies at least equal to 7 percent of the average daily rate of the group's final
consumption during the previous year, each participant must implement demand re-
straint measures sufficient to reduce its final consumption by an amount equal to 7
percent. IEP art. 13.
If the rate in reduction of supplies rises to 12 percent, then the corresponding cut in
demand must be 10 percent. IEP art. 14. In the event that an individual participating
country (or several but less than the group as a whole) sustains or can reasonably be
expected to sustain a reduction in its oil supply equal to or exceeding 7 percent, the
country affected must reduce its own consumption by 7 percent. IEP art. 8. In the case of
a very severe or protracted crisis which consumes half the emergency reserves of the
participating countries, the IEA can decide upon further emergency steps, including addi-
tional demand restraint measures. IEP art. 20, paras. 1 & 3.
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as a whole loses between seven and twelve percent of its normal
consumption, the system operates as follows. First, each country
restrains demand seven percent. Second, the remaining shortfall
is shared among all participating countries on the basis of a
mutual system of oil-sharing. Each participant is granted a "sup-
ply right" which is determined by that country's average daily
rate of consumption. This rate will reflect both the appropriate
demand restraint measure and a deduction of that country's
emergency reserve drawdown obligation.3' If the supply right, so
calculated, exceeds the sum of the country's normal domestic oil
production and actual oil imports available during an emergency,
then that country is entitled to additional net imports equal to
the excess. A corresponding "allocation obligation" binds any
participant whose "supply right" is exceeded by domestic pro-
duction and imports. The obligation is to supply, directly or indi-
rectly, its excess supply of oil to other participating countries.32
When the reduction in supplies affects an individual partici-
pating country, it is granted an "oil allocation right." 3  As indi-
cated above, in this situation, the country concerned must absorb
a part of the reduction in supplies up to a level equal to seven
percent of its total consumption for the previous year. The alloca-
tion right is designed to satisfy any shortfall in supplies over and
above that level. The corresponding allocation obligation to sup-
ply oil is shared by the other participating countries.34
The Program envisages that the allocation arrangements will
be implemented largely by the international oil companies and
that, insofar as possible, oil will be distributed through normal
channels at market prices. Each participating country is under an
obligation to ensure the cooperation of the companies, willing or
otherwise, in implementing the allocation scheme. 35
31. IEP art. 7. The term "emergency reserve drawdown obligation" means the emer-
gency reserve commitment of the group multiplied by the group supply shortfall. Id. at
para. 5.
32. Id. at para. 3.
33. Id. at art. 8.
34. Whenever an allocation of oil takes place a number of criteria must be met. These
include: the principle of fair treatment for all participants; the use of comparable commer-
cial transactions as the yardstick for determining the price of the oil allocated; and the
preservation of historical trade patterns as far as is reasonable taking into account in
particular the position of non-participating countries. Id. at art. 11.
35. Id. at art. 6, para. 1.
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It is noteworthy that these mechanisms for dealing with a
shortfall are automatically activated under the Program and can
be reversed only by a substantial majority vote of the participat-
ing countries.36 According to newspaper reports, the International
Energy Agency is simulating an oil embargo much like the one
that occurred in 1973 in order to test the readiness of the oil-
sharing arrangements.37
The United States response to the IEP has been the passage of
the Energy Policy and Conservation Act.38 Under this Act, the
United States will create a Strategic Petroleum Reserve for the
storage of up to one billion barrels of petroleum products, includ-
ing an Early Storage Reserve for the storage of not less than 150
million barrels of such products.3 The Energy Policy and Conser-
vation Act also provides for the creation of a Strategic Petroleum
Reserve Office in the Federal Energy Administration (FEA),
which obligates the Administrator of that Office to submit a
Strategic Reserve Plan to Congress." This plan "details the Ad-
ministrator's proposals for designing, constructing, and filling the
storage and related facilities of the Reserve,"' 1 and is to contain
a great variety of information specified by the Act.'2
Under the Energy Policy and Conservation Act, the President
is directed, within 180 days of the date of enactment of the Act,
to transmit to Congress one or more energy conservation contin-
gency plans and a rationing contingency plan. 3 No contingency
plan may become effective unless four conditions are met: (1) the
President previously has transmitted the plan to Congress; (2)
36. Id. at art. 19, para. 3.
37. N.Y. Times, Sept. 17, 1976, at D1, col. 4.
38. 42 U.S.C. §6201 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
39. 42 U.S.C. §6231(b) (1975). The President is obligated to transmit a plan for an Early
Storage Reserve to Congress within 90 days of enactment of the Act and the 150 million
barrels of petroleum are to be in storage by the end of three years.
40. Id. at §6234(a)(b). On December 15, 1976, the Administration sent a plan to Con-
gress which would store 500 million barrels of crude oil in Gulf Coast underground caverns
close to major pipeline systems. N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 1976, at 77, col. 1.
41. 42 U.S.C. §6234(b) (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
42. Id. at §6234(e). Both the plan for a Strategic Petroleum Reserve and the plan for
an Early Storage Reserve are subject to approval by either House of Congress. Id.
§6421(c)(1). If neither House disapproves of the plan, the President is authorized to
implement it. Id. at §6239.
43. 42 U.S.C. §6261(a)(1) (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
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the plan has been approved by resolution by each House of Con-
gress within sixty calendar days after transmittal; (3) the Presi-
dent has found that putting such contingency plan into effect is
required by a severe energy supply interruption or in order to
fulfill United States obligations under the IEP; and (4) the Presi-
dent has communicated such a finding to Congress." In addition,
a rationing contingency plan may not become effective unless the
President has sent to Congress a request to put such a plan into
effect, and neither House of Congress has disapproved, or both
Houses have approved, such a request within fifteen calendar
days of transmittal. 5
As specified by the Act 4 a "rationing continency plan" is to be
implemented in accordance with the petroleum allocation system
of the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973.11 No ration-
ing contingency plan may impose any tax or user fee, except to
the extent a user fee is necessary to defray the cost of administer-
ing the plan." All authority to carry out any rationing contin-
gency plan is to expire on the same date as authority to issue and
44. Id. at §6261(b).
45. Id. at §6261(c). The Act provides for two exceptions to these limitations upon
presidential action. First, in order to permit the President to carry out United States
obligations under the IEP, he is permitted, without going through the second step of
congressional review, to put into effect a contingency plan that has been approved by the
60-day congressional approval procedure, if he determines that there is a 7 percent short-
fall in petroleum supplies to the IEP countries as a group. This authority could be exer-
cised only to the extent determined necessary by the President to comply with U.S.
obligations under the IEP. Id. Second, as a transitional measure, the President, beginning
within 90 days after the date of enactment of the Act, is permitted to put the contingency
plan into effect for a period of no longer than 60 days. The President may do this only if
he finds that putting such a contingency plan into effect is required by a severe energy
supply interruption or by the IEP; if he has transmitted to Congress a plan to put such
action into effect; and if neither House of Congress has-disapproved (or both Houses of
Congress have approved) such request in accordance with the 15-day congressional review
procedure. Id. at §6261(e).
The Act further defines an "energy conservation contingency plan" as one "which
imposes reasonable restrictions on the public or private use of energy necessary to reduce
energy consumption." Id. at §6262(a)(1). The Act further provides, however, that such a
plan may not "impose rationing of any tax, tariff, or user fee" or "contain any provisions
respecting the price of petroleum products." Id. at §6262(a)(2).
46. Id. at §6263(a)(1).
47. 15 U.S.C. §751 (1970 & Supp. HI 1973).
48. 42 U.S.C. §6263(e) (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
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enforce rules and orders under the Emergency Petroleum Alloca-
tion Act. 9
The Energy Policy and Conservation Act also authorizes the
President to prescribe rules requiring "persons engaged in pro-
ducing, transporting, refining, distributing, or storing petroleum
products" and subject to the jurisdiction of the United States to
engage in such action as the President determines is necessary for
the United States to fulfill its obligations under the IEP relating
to the international allocation of oil products." The rules provide
that the President may specify the amounts and the prices of the
oil to be allocated.' However, no such rule may come into effect
unless the President transmits the rule to Congress, and neither
House of Congress has disapproved (or both Houses have ap-
proved) the rule in accordance with the fifteen day Congressional
review procedure. 2 Moreover, the rule has to be resubmitted
every eighteen months to Congress for its review. 53
The Energy Policy and Conservation Act also requires the FEA
Administrator, with the approval of the Attorney General, to pre-
scribe which persons engaged in the business of producing, refin-
ing, marketing, or distributing petroleum products may develop
and carry out voluntary agreements to implement the allocation
provisions of the IEP.54 Any such voluntary agreement must be
submitted in writing to the Attorney General and to the Federal
Trade Commission twenty days before being implemented.55 A
voluntary agreement may not be carried out unless approved by
the Attorney General.5" The Attorney General may review,
amend, modify, disapprove, or revoke a voluntary agreement at
any time.57
49. Id. at §6263(f).
50. 42 U.S.C. §6271(a) (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
51. Id.
52. Id. at §6271(b)(1).
53. Id.
54. 42 U.S.C. §6272(b).
55. Id. at §6272(d)(2).
56. Id. at §6272(d)(1).
57. Id. Actions taken in good faith to develop or carry out a voluntary agreement for
the international allocation of oil are immune to any civil or criminal action brought under
federal or state antitrust laws. Id. at §6272(f)(1). The Attorney General and the Federal
Trade Commission are required to report, at least every 6 months, to Congress and the
President on the impact on competition and on small business of actions taken pursuant
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The Financial Support Fund
Strictly speaking, the plan for a Financial Support Fund is not
a part of the International Energy Program, since it is set forth
in a separate agreement signed by all OECD members except
Turkey.5" However, the Financial Support Fund is related inti-
mately to and supportive of the goals of the IEP, since it would
establish a $25 billion fund to provide short to medium-term
financing to participating members that may be faced with ex-
traordinary financing needs precipitated by severe increases in oil
prices. Under this arrangement all participants agree to join in
assisting one of their members if an extreme need develops. The
Fund would constitute an insurance mechanism or financial
"safety net," supporting and strengthening but not supplanting
other sources of financing. Loans would be made to a borrower by
the Fund only on condition that specific policy guidelines in the
energy and general economic areas were met, with a view to
correction of the borrower's external financial difficulties."
At this writing fifteen members of the OECD have become full
members of the Support Fund, and an additional five members
have almost completed the process. However, congressional oppo-
sition to the plan appears likely to block United States participa-
tion, and the Federal Republic of Germany, which, along with the
United States would have to provide most of the money for any
borrowings under the plan, has made its participation dependent
on the United States joining."
Information Systems on the International Oil Market and
Consultations with Oil Companies
Because of the inability of the industrialized countries to ob-
tain sufficient information during the oil embargo, a primary
objective of the International Energy Program has been the estab-
to these voluntary agreements. Id. at §6272(i). The antitrust immunity granted by the Act
expires on June 30, 1979, unless extended until June 30, 1985, pursuant to procedures
specified by the Act. Id. at §6272(j).
58. See 14 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 979 (1975).
59. See letter from President Ford to Speaker of the House and President of the Senate
(June 6, 1975), reprinted in 72 DEPT. STATE BULL. 81 (July 14, 1975) (transmitting legisla-
tion authorizing U.S. participation in the Fund).
60. N.Y. Times, Sept. 29, 1976, at 53, col. 1.
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lishment of a mechanism to assure that participating countries
are informed sufficiently regarding the operation of the interna-
tional oil market and the activities of the international oil compa-
nies. To this end the Program provides for a two-part information
system operated by the IEA Secretariat:" (1) a general section
including data on the international oil market and the operations
of oil companies during noncrisis periods;"2 (2) a special section
to provide the additional information required for efficient opera-
tion of the emergency program in a period of crisis."3 Each partici-
pating country is obligated to ensure that the oil companies make
the information available."
Section 214 of the Energy Policy and Conservation Act author-
izes the FEA Administrator to provide the Secretary of State with
data related to the energy industry. 5 The information is then
transmitted to the International Energy Agency. The President
is permitted to withhold information from transmittal to the IEA
if competition would be prejudiced." Also, if the information to
61. IEP art. 25.
62. Id. at art. 27. The information which each Participating Country is obligated to
make available to the IEA Secretariat includes data on:
(a) Corporate structure; (b) Financial structure, including balance sheets,
profit and loss accounts, and taxes paid; (c) Capital investments realized; (d)
Terms of arrangements for access to major sources of crude oil; (e) Current rates
of production and anticipated changes therein; (f) Allocations of available
crude supplies to affiliates and other customers (criteria and realizations);
(g) Stocks; (h) Cost of crude oil and oil products; (i) Prices, including transfer
prices to affiliates; and (j) Other subjects, as decided by the Governing Board,
acting by unanimity.
63. Id. at arts. 32 & 33. Under Article 33, participating countries are obligated to
provide the Secretariat with data concerning:
(a) Oil consumption and supply; (b) Demand restraint measures; (c) Levels
of emergency reserves; (d) Availability and utilization of transportation facili-
ties; (e) Current and projected levels of international supply and demand; and
(f) Other subjects, as decided by the Governing Board, acting by unanimity.
64. Id. at art. 27, para. 2. This information is given on a "non-proprietary basis," i.e.,
it excludes information relating to patents, trademarks, individual sales, tax returns,
customer lists and geological matters. Id. at art. 28. Any data supplied must not prejudice
competition nor conflict with the competition law of any participating country. Id. at art.
27, para. 3. The Program also envisages the establishment, within the IEA, of consultation
procedures between Participating Countries and individual oil companies with respect to
all important aspects of the oil industry. In their discretion, participating countries "may
share among themselves on a cooperative basis the results of such consultations." Id. at
art. 37(1).
65. 42 U.S.C. §6274(a)(1) (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
66. Id. at §6274(b).
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be transmitted is a trade secret or is commercial or financial
information protected by the "trade secret" exemption of the
Freedom of Information Act, prior to transmittal, it must be ag-
gregated, accumulated, or otherwise reported in such a manner
as to avoid identifying the person who submitted the informa-
tion." However, in the event of an international energy supply
emergency, this information could be transmitted without regard
to such safeguards . 8 The Act further provides companies partici-
pating in the IEA's information exchange program with immun-
ity from antitrust laws." The Attorney General and the Federal
Trade Commission have reportedly authorized such participation
by seventeen United States oil companies.7"
Long-Term Cooperation on Energy
In order to reduce their dependence on imported oil, the partic-
ipating countries have agreed to undertake national programs for
the development of energy resources. Included are cooperative
programs that provide for the exchange of information and the
concerting of national policies.7 These cooperative programs will
concentrate in four main areas: conservation of energy, develop-
ment of alternative sources of energy, energy research and devel-
opment, and uranium enrichment.
With respect to energy conservation, IEA members agreed to
reduce oil imports for the group as a whole by two million barrels
per day by the end of 1975.72 The United States share of this
reduction was one million barrels per day in proportion to its
share of total IEA consumption.3 In addition, the IEA Secretariat
67. Id. at §6274(a)(2)(A).
68. Id. at §6274(a)(2)(B)(i).
69. Id. at §6272(a)&(f)(1).
70. OIL AND GAS J., April 19, 1976, at 43.
71. IEP arts. 41 & 42.
72. Legislation on the International Energy Agency, Hearings on Implementing Agree-
ments with the IEA Before the Subcomm. on International Resources, Food and Energy
and Subcomm. on International Organizations of the House Comm. on International
Relations, 94th Cong,, 1st Sess. 7,8 (1975) (statement of Thomas 0. Enders) [hereinafter
cited as Statement of Thomas 0. Enders].
73. Although both the IEA as a whole, and the U.S. in particular, were able to meet
these targets, this success was due largely to the reduction in consumption caused by the
recession and may have "led to complacency about the need for a strong conservation
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is to formally review individual, national conservation programs
and assess their effectiveness." ' Under the surveys conducted to
date, the IEA consistently has found that conservation efforts by
the United States are the worst among member countries.75
On January 30, 1976, the Governing Board of IEA adopted a
program of long-term cooperation in the field of energy.76 This
program consists of four primary elements: (1) the establishment
of a common minimum price of $7.00 per barrel below which IEA
members will not allow imported oil to be sold within their do-
mestic economies; (2) the fixing of joint conservation targets and
the intensive review of national conservation programs;" (3) pro-
vision for investment incentives in high cost energy projects; 8 and
policy." See Statement of Secretary Kissinger before the Ministerial Meeting of the IEA
in Paris (May 27, 1975).
74. Statement of Thomas 0. Enders, supra note 72, at 8.
75. N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 1976, at 11, col. 5.
76. For the text of the Program, see 15 INT'L LEGAL MATEmALS 249 (March 1976). For a
summary of some of the Program's highlights, see 73 DEP'T STATE BuLL. 261 (March 1,
1976).
77. For a recent report on an IEA review of national conservation programs, see N.Y.
Times, Nov. 2, 1976, at 39, col. 4.
78. Under the long-term cooperation program, the governments of the parties partici-
pating in a cooperative project agree to facilitate investment (including investment in
exploration for and exploitation of energy sources) by endeavoring to:
Accord national treatment and most favoured nation treatment to such
enterprises, or parties;
Avoid the introduction of new limitations upon the extent to which such enter-
prises are accorded national treatment and most favoured nation treatment with
respect to such co-operative energy projects;
Use good offices where requested and where appropriate;
Avoid the introduction of limitations on the exchange of skilled manpower, and
materials and equipment, taking into account the needs and the possibilities of
the countries concerned, which may be required for successful completion of
such projects as well as on associated transactions in financial assets, including
the repatriation of profits of such enterprises;
Take account in considering alterations of taxation and production policy as
they relate to those projects of the effect of such alterations on the economics of
such projects including projects already under way;
Avoid introducing, once such a project is established, new measures which
would make mandatory a change in the degree of participation by enterprises
from other Participating Countries.
15 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 255-56 (March 1976).
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(4) cooperation in energy research and development, including
the pooling of national programs in related projects. 9
The first element of this program, agreement on a minimum
price for imported oil, has been the most controversial. Alterna-
tive sources of energy, such as coal, nuclear and solar power, and
Outer Continental Shelf oil, are expensive to develop, and their
development will require enormous capital investments. In order
to encourage such investment, protection must be given to do-
mestic investors against cut-throat price competition from low
cost imported oil. Establishing a minimum price below which
imported oil may not be sold in domestic markets will afford such
protection. 0
A primary argument against the minimum import price plan
in the Uniied States, however, has been that it would have infla-
tionary effects on the economy and impose too great a financial
burden on the consumer. As an alternative, some have proposed
that the government should become the risk-bearer on particular
capital investments in high cost energy projects.8' However, the
subsidization of domestic investment in alternative energy
sources would constitute an enormous drain on the United States
Treasury.2 In addition, this proposed alternative ignores the ben-
eficial effect of the minimum import price plan, which is the
restriction placed on importation of cheap oil that would increase
domestic consumption and dependence on unreliable foreign
sources. Moreover, despite the higher cost to the consumer, the
total cost of this cheap oil would be great because large imports
of oil induced by the cheap price would have adverse affects on
the United States balance of trade.
Although agreement on a common minimum price for imported
79. This element of the program may be difficult to implement. According to newspaper
reports, Canada has resisted allowing other countries to exploit Canadian oil on the
ground that Canada's oil producing provinces rather than the federal government in
Ottawa have control over their resources. Wall St. J., Feb. 2, 1976, at 17, col. 5.
80. See Statement of Thomas 0. Enders, supra note 72, at 9.
81. See questions asked and comments made by Congressman Fraser, Legislation on
the International Energy Agency, Hearings on Implementing Agreements with the IEA
Before the Subcomm. on International Resources, Food and Energy and Subcomm. on
International Organizations of the House Comm. on International Relations, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. 7, 17 (1975) (questions by Mr. Fraser).
82. See Statement of Thomas 0. Enders, supra note 72 at 17-19.
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oil was reached in principle in preliminary IEA negotiations,
there was disagreement among member countries as to the level
of the price. Those countries with substantial domestic produc-
tion of their own not surprisingly favored a relatively high floor.
Conversely, those countries with little or no domestic oil produc-
tion favored a relatively low floor.83 The $7.00 per barrel figure
represents a compromise between these two positions.
Should there be an attempt by oil-exporting countries to en-
gage in predatory pricing in United States domestic markets, the
executive branch expects to be able to maintain the minimum
price of $7.00 a barrel by the imposition of import fees. In FEA
v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 4 the Supreme Court recently upheld the
President's authority to impose fees on imported oil for national
security reasons.85 The Court rejected the plaintiffs' contention
that this section authorized only the use of quotas for this pur-
pose."
Member countries of IEA are attempting to reach agreement
on the details of long range joint conservation targets, joint energy
development projects, and joint energy research projects. The
ultimate form these targets and projects take will determine in
part whether it will be necessary for the executive branch to seek
83. In hearings on legislation to implement the IEP, the executive branch was asked
why the President should be given blanket authority to establish a floor price for petro-
leum when the current price of $11 to $12 per barrel was at least 50% above the compro-
mise figure of $7 to $8 per barrel likely to be reached by IEA. The answer was that, in
view of the low cost of production of oil in the Middle East, the ability of the oil producers
to engage in predatory price cutting was substantial and the mere threat of such action
was a serious deterrent to domestic energy investment. Further, because of the long lead
times, (usually several years duration) involved in energy investments, the decisions in
favor of such investments had to be made now. See Appendix to Legislation on the
International Energy Agency, Hearings on Implementing Agreements with the IEA Before
the Subcomm. on International Resources, Food and Energy and Subcomm. on Interna-
tional Oraganizations of the House Comm. on International Relations, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. 49 (1975).
84. 426 U.S. 548 (1976).
85. Act of Mar. 26, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 1981(c)(1)(A).
86. In so holding, the Court first rejected respondents' contention that Section 232(b)
must be construed narrowly in order to avoid "a serious question of unconstitutional
delegation of legislative power." 426 U.S. at 558-59. The Court concluded that on the basis
both of the language of the statute and of its legislative history, Congress intended to grant
the President a measure of discretion in determining the method to be used to adjust
imports. Id. at 561-71.
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further legislative authorization to enable the United States to
participate fully in the IEA's program of long-term cooperation. 7
Relations with Oil Producing and Other Oil Consuming Countries
The part of the Program addressing the relations with oil pro-
ducing and other oil consuming countries is the most ambitious
and arguably the most important in economic and political
terms, but is also the least clearly defined. Most of the Program's
provisions relating to it speak in generalities. For example, the
Program expresses the hope that participating countries "will
endeavor to promote cooperative relations with oil producing
countries," by "identifying opportunities for a purposeful dia-
logue." 8 The one objective that is clearly specified is "promoting
secure oil supplies on reasonable and equitable terms for each
Participating Country. '"89
In seeking to achieve these objectives, the participating coun-
tries are to give full consideration to the needs and interests of
other oil consuming countries, particularly those of the develop-
ing countries. 0 Also, participating countries are to exchange
views on their relations with oil producing countries and are to
inform each other of cooperative action on their part with produ-
cer countries which is relevant to the objectives of the program."
Currently, there has been little progress toward achievement of
these goals. A meeting in Paris, in April 1974, between oil produc-
ing and oil consuming countries broke up in acrimony because of
inability to agree on an agenda. The United States wanted to
limit discussion to energy and the developing countries de-
manded the inclusion of a host of other international economic
issues. Further preliminary negotiations in October 1975 were
successful in reaching agreement on a wide-ranging agenda for a
Conference on International Economic Cooperation.2 In prepara-
tion for this conference, commissions, including one on energy,
were set up to consider the various subjects. 3 The energy commis-
87. See 73 DEP'T STATE BULL. 262 (March 1, 1976).
88. IEP art. 44.
89. Id. at art. 47, para. 1.
90. Id. at art. 45.
91. Id. at art. 46.
92. Wall St. J., Oct. 24, 1975, at 14, col. 3.
93. These four commissions include: the Commission on Energy, the Commission on
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sion, co-chaired by Saudi Arabia and the United States, has
made little progress toward reaching agreement. According to
informed sources in the Department of State, member countries
of IEA have reached agreement on a common negotiating posi-
tion. Reportedly, the negotiations in Paris do not include at-
tempts to reach agreement on oil prices or on security of supply.
Rather, they are being undertaken with the following three pri-
mary goals in mind: (1) to reach agreement on what supplies of
energy, including oil and alternative sources, are currently avail-
able and on what may be available over the next decade or two;
(2) to engage in cooperative projects, such as the creation of an
international energy institute"4 for the benefit of the non-oil
producing developing countries; and (3) to establish formal insti-
tutional arrangements for a continuing dialogue between the oil
producing and the oil consuming countries.
Institutional Structure of IEA
The International Energy Agency was established as a perma-
nent, autonomous body "within the framework of the Organiza-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)."" It
includes a Governing Board, four Standing Groups on Emergency
Questions, the Oil Market, Long Term Cooperation Relations
with Producer and Other Consumer Countries, and a Secretariat,
headed by an Executive Director appointed by the Governing
Board which services the various organs of the Agency.
Raw Materials, the Commission on Development, and the Commission on Financial Af-
fairs.
94. The resolution adopted on September 16, 1975, by the Seventh Special Session of
the U.N. General Assembly,
invites the Secretary-General to carry out a preliminary study and to report to
the Assembly at its thirty-first session on the possibility of establishing, within
the framework of the United Nations system, an international energy institute
to assist all developing countries in energy resources research and development.
The text of the resolution may be most conveniently found in 14 INT'L LEGAL MAamALS
1524 (Nov. 1975).
95. See the eighth preambulary paragraph of the IEP Agreement.
96. IEP art. 50. The Governing Board, composed of Ministers or their delegates from
each participating country, is the supreme decision-making organ of the Agency. It has
the authority either to adopt binding decisions or to make non-binding recommendations.
Id. at art. 51. Voting involves a complex set of procedures, and may, depending on the
circumstances, require unanimity (art. 61(1)(b)), a weighted majority (art. 63(3)), or a
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It should be emphasized that where the necessary conditions
are present, the activation of emergency measures regarding de-
mand restraint and oil-sharing is automatic and does not require
a decision of the Governing Board. Rather, a special majority of
the Governing Board is required for a decision not to activate
emergency measures as well as to deactivate emergency measures
currently in effect. 7
Ill. THE INTERNATIONAL ENERGY PROGRAM: PRESENT PROBLEMS
AND FUTURE PROSPECTS
Predicting the Actions of Oil Consuming and Oil Producing
Nations
The problem of international control of energy resources is in-
extricably intertwined with other issues in the world community's
debate on a "new international economic order." Despite the inti-
tial opposition of the United States, this interdependence has
been recognized formally by the recent decision of the Conference
on International Economic Cooperation to include a wide variety
of issues besides energy. However, so far there has been only
limited cooperation on energy or on other issues in the interna-
tional economic area.
This lack of agreement and cooperation is not limited to rela-
tions between oil producing and oil consuming countries or to
relations between developed and developing countries. Assuming,
for the moment, that the International Energy Program repre-
sents a major step toward cooperative efforts on energy resources
by the industrialized countries, its success is by no means as-
sured. France has refused to join IEA, terming it an "energy
NATO," because of its integrated staff and alleged dominance by
the United States. Norway, which is soon to become an exporter
of oil as a result of its North Sea deposits, has opted for an
special weighted majority. Id. at art. 62(4). Under the weighted voting system, which
governs most decisions of the Board, each participating country is given three "general
weights," plus additional weights based on its level of oil comsumption. Id. at art. 62(2).
Under the weighted voting system, decisions require 60 percent of the total combined
weights, as well as a minimum number of parties. Id. at art. 62(3). The United States has
approximately one-third of the combined weights, Id. at art. 62(2).
97. IEP arts. 19, 23 & 24.
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"associate status." Further, from the outset there have been ten-
sions between those members of the IEA which, like the United
States, have substantial domestic oil producing capacity and
those which, like Japan, have little or no independent source of
supply. Whether the industrialized countries would maintain
unity in the face of a new oil embargo or some other crisis in the
supply of oil is therefore still an open question.
Certainly, the provisions of the International Energy Program
demand restraint. Oil-sharing arrangements appear to provide a
mechanism by which the industrialized countries might be able
to deal more adequately with possible future interruptions of the
supply of oil than they did with the oil embargo of 1973. However,
the effectiveness of these arrangements in the face of an actual
embargo remains problematical. As noted earlier, because of the
diverse and often conflicting interests of IEA members, the risk
is considerable that one or more members will pursue individual
goals to the detriment of other members in the event of an oil
shortage. The testing of the oil-sharing arrangements currently
being conducted by the IEA is a useful exercise, but it will not
answer several crucial questions. It does not answer whether, in
a real political crisis, governments and the oil companies would
be willing to risk the wrath of oil producing states that have cut
off exports or whether governments would be able to divert oil to
short markets without incurring steep price mark-ups . 8 Further,
IEA member countries, especially the United States, have been
slow to establish the strategic reserves of oil required for waiting
out an oil supply shortage of substantial duration. Also, the
United States has not yet adopted fully developed contingency
plans for demand restraint and rationing to be employed in the
event of a shortage.
Some might contend that, in focusing its primary attention on
measures to cope with an oil shortage, the IEA has been busy
planning for the last war, since current indications are that the
chances of a new oil embargo are extremely remote. However, one
cannot rule out this possibility in light of the volatile nature of
the Middle East situation. Moreover, Walter J. Levy, a promi-
nent oil economist, recently suggested that, until oil from major
98. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 17, 1976, at Dl, col. 4.
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non-OPEC sources such as the North Sea and Alaska's North
Slope begin to have an impact in 1978, the world may experience
a short term oil supply shortage.9 According to Levy's analysis,
such a shortage is likely to develop unless Saudi Arabia, the only
OPEC member with meaningful surplus capacity, is willing to
raise its level of production to meet increased demand by the
industrialized countries. Levy contends that if Saudi Arabia de-
cides to maintain its present level of production, the market
would be inadequate by about one million barrels a day or more.
Prices therefore would be pushed up by market forces.
There are two other possible scenarios. Under the first, Saudi
Arabia would lift its production level without simultaneously
raising prices on the ground that the mid-1977 surge in demand
was exceptional and will be eliminated as a problem once the new
capacity for oil production comes into operation. Under the sec-
ond, Saudi Arabia would lift its production level, but use it as the
occasion and the excuse for raising oil prices as well.
It is speculation at this point which path Saudi Arabia is likely
to follow. However, in the view of this observer, Saudi Arabia is
unlikely to decide to limit production and let the resulting shor-
tages push up oil prices. Such a course of action appears to be
contrary to Saudi Arabia's interests in several respects. First, it
would seriously undermine Saudi Arabia's relations with the new
United States administration. Second, the destabilizing effects of
an oil shortage and a consequent increase in oil prices on the
economies of the oil consuming countries might be severe, espe-
cially when they are just beginning, at least according to some
indications, to recover from a recession. Third, the reaction of the
industrialized countries probably would be, at a minimum, to
intensify their conservation efforts and their programs to develop
alternative sources of energy, thus accelerating the demise of
OPEC's control over energy sources and prices.
Accordingly, this writer believes that Saudi Arabia probably
will increase production and agree to a corresponding price rise.
The likelihood of this possibility is enhanced by the interest of
other OPEC members, such as Iran, in maximizing current reve-
nues in order to fulfill ambitious internal development plans and
99. N.Y. Times, Aug. 25, 1976, at 45, col. 5.
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offset the rising costs of imports from the industrialized coun-
tries. 00 If this analysis is correct, the greatest danger appears to
be not that OPEC will cut off supplies of oil, but rather that the
price of this oil will be so prohibitively high as to inflict severe
damage on the economies of the oil importing countries through
the creation of inflationary pressures along the lines experienced
during 1973 to 1974. The magnitude of this damage will depend
upon the level of the price.
Economic Effects of Oil Price Rise
At the time of writing, OPEC members have disagreed among
themselves on prices for the next six months. Saudi Arabia and
the United Arab Emirates will increase their prices by five per-
cent, and the other eleven members of OPEC will raise their
prices by ten percent on January 1, 1977, and by another five
percent on July 1.10, The effects of this two-tier pricing system are
uncertain because it is unclear whether OPEC will be able to
maintain the two sets of prices. Saudi Arabia has indicated its
willingness to go to full production capacity in order to meet
increased demand for its lower priced oil, and overall demand
may be at least temporarily diminished because of the oil compa-
nies' stockpiling of oil in anticipation of a price increase. 102 The
result may be a sharp decrease in demand for the higher priced
oil of the other eleven OPEC members, with corresponding pres-
sure on its price. 103 Some doubt exists, however, whether Saudi
Arabia will be able to produce enough crude petroleum to force
the other eleven countries to lower their prices.101
Assuming that the two-tier system survives, oil consuming
countries are expected to pay approximately $10 billion more for
their oil, and to experience slower economic growth, higher unem-
ployment, and higher inflation. 15 The Organization for Economic
100. For a description of the different perspectives of Saudi Arabia and Iran on the level
of oil production and prices, see E. FRIED & C. SCHULTZE, HIGHER OIL PRICES AND THE
WORLD ECONOMY 264-67 (1975).
101. N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 1976, at 1, col. 6.
102. N.Y. Times, Dec. 18, 1976, at 1, col. 5.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
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Cooperation and Development has projected that the full ten
percent increase could cut world economic growth by one-half
percentage point and raise the cost of living by up to one
percent. 10 Economists point out, however, that the impact of
these new prices will vary widely. In the United States, for exam-
ple, which imports much of its oil from Saudi Arabia, the effect
should be modest. Gasoline prices should rise by between seven-
tenths and 1.4 cents a gallon; the consumer price index should
increase 0.1 to 0.2 percent; and growth of the gross national prod-
uct in the United States should decline by three-tenths of one
percent by the end of 1977.107
These estimated costs in terms of GNP and consumer spending
have been calculated on the assumption that current restrictive
monetary and fiscal policies would continue in effect. However,
liberal economists argue that such policies exacerbate the costs
to GNP and consumer spending and should be replaced by more
stimulative policies. 0s In their view, the apparent inflationary
aspects of the oil price increases mask the contractionist and
recessionary effects of wealth draining away to the OPEC coun-
tries. To combat such recessionary effects, these economists rec-
ommend that the governments of the industrialized countries,
particularly the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany
and Japan, increase government spending in order to compensate
for the new income the OPEC countries would not be pumping
back into the world economy. 09 Conservative economists, on the
other hand, strongly criticize this view, contending that the adop-
tion of stimulative monetary and fiscal policies in the face of
106. Id. Reportedly, one U.S. Government analysis estimated that even a 5% increase
will reduce the overall rate of real growth for seven major nations: the United States,
Japan, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Britain, Italy and Canada, by three-
tenths of a point in 1977. Consumer prices will rise by roughly the same amount, while
unemployment will increase about 0.2%. Newsweek, Dec. 27, 1976, at 29.
107. N.Y. Times, Dec. 18, 1976, at 33, col. 1. Despite growing dependence on foreign
oil, the United States still imports proportionally less than Japan or European countries,
and 23% of the imports come from Saudi Arabia and thus reflect the minimum price rise.
Similarly, the Federal Republic of Germany should be able to cope with the price increase
with comparative ease because the value of the Deutschemark increased 9.4% against the
dollar (the currency of oil transactions) and that will more than offset the higher prices.
Newsweek, Dec. 27, 1976, at 29.
108. See HIGHER OIL PRICES AND THE WORLD ECONOMY, supra note 100, at 57-63.
109. Id.
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higher OPEC oil prices would result in inflationary pressures that
ultimately could bring about a complete break-down in the world
economy." 0
There seems to be a consensus among economists that the econ-
omies of the stronger industrialized countries should be able to
adapt to and live with the increase in OPEC oil prices. However,
there is great concern as to the industrialized countries with
weaker economies, such as the United Kingdom and Italy, and
the non-oil developing countries of the Third and Fourth Worlds.
In part because of balance of payment difficulties exacerbated by
current OPEC oil prices, the United Kingdom and Italy are ex-
pected to seek extremely large loans from the International Mon-
etary Fund (IMF) in 1977, with the United Kingdom alone seek-
ing to borrow $3.9 billion. At the 1976 annual meeting of the IMF
in Manila, then United States Secretary of the Treasury William
E. Simon told the finance ministers of more than 100 oil-
importing countries that they faced a balance of payments deficit
of about $50 billion in 1977 as the counterpart of an increase in
the surplus of the oil-producing countries."2 Mr. Simon estimated
that the industrialized countries' share of this deficit would be
$35 billion, with the rest incurred by the non-oil developing coun-
tries."' Moreover, Mr. Simon suggested that the oil-importing
countries would find it more difficult to finance their payment
deficits in 1977 because many countries are reaching the limits
of their ability to take on more debt. Mr. Simon's estimates of
the deficits of the oil-consuming countries were made on the basis
of the 1976 price of OPEC oil, and he noted that, "if the oil-
producing nations take, as is now rumored, the dangerous step of
110. Italy and the United Kingdom, having balance of payment difficulties caused in
part by current OPEC oil prices, are expected to seek extremely large loans from the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1977 to help alleviate this problem. The United
Kingdom alone is seeking to borrow $3.9 billion. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1976, at 51,
col. 6.
111. Id. Mr. Simon estimated that the industrialized countries' share of this deficit
would be $35 billion, with the remainder incurred by the non-oil producing countries,
based on the 1976 OPEC price of oil. N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 1976, at 65, col. 5.
112. Mr. Simon also noted that "[further] raising the price of oil ...would seriously
aggravate an already troublesome economic and financial situation." N.Y. Times, Oct.
6, 1976, at 65, col. 5.
113. Id.
1977]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
again raising the price of oil, it would seriously aggravate an
already troublesome economic and financial situation.""' 4
Mr. Simon's grim projections are supported by IMF reports.
The IMF estimated that the collective deficit of the oil-importing
countries will be $40 billion in 1976, as world oil demand has
begun to increase with recovery from the recession and as the
rapid increase in the imports of machinery and other goods by the
oil-exporting countries has begun to level off." The heavy bor-
rowing incurred over the last two years to support these deficits
reduced the IMF's stock of lendable funds-currencies from
strong economy countries that others want to borrow-from
about $11.5 billion in April 1975, to some $6.3 billion in late
1976.111 By the end of 1976, the IMF estimated, the figure could
fall further to about $4.6 billion, as compared with the $7.4 billion
the IMF lent in the year ending in April, 1976, and the $5.8 billion
lent in the previous year."7
IMF officials maintain that they should be able to avoid a
liquidity crisis for the next year or so, as improvement in the
world economy reduces demand for credit and new sources of
lendable funds become available. However, they concede that
their optimistic view could be altered radically by a prolonged
recession or a substantial increase in oil prices. Also, some con-
servative countries, the United States in particular, have ex-
pressed opposition to solutions such as debt forgiveness."8
Energy Conservation and Developing Alternative Sources
With regard to energy conservation, the IEA recently reported
that, in terms of the ratio of total primary energy use to GNP,
114. Id.
115. N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, at 51, col. 6.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 1976, at 65, col. 5. According to a study prepared by the
Morgan Guaranty Trust Company, total new international credit was up to $78 billion in
1976, compared with $61 billion in 1975. Such major debtors as Brazil and Mexico were
facing the necessity of refinancing maturing debt, and Brazil reportedly had an external
debt that was 68% of its gross national product. Similarly, Canada reportedly had a
greater external debt in relation to gross national product and exports than that of Great
Britain. N.Y. Times, Dec. 23, 1976, at 35, col. 3.
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the United States, as well as several other major industrial coun-
tries, failed to cut its consumption of energy over the 1973 to 1975
period."' Indications are that only the effects of the economic
slowdown prevented an increase in total consumption of energy
during that period. In the view of the IEA Secretariat, the United
States and some other IEA member countries need to adopt en-
ergy saving measures that would price energy at world market
levels, introduce effective automobile and other transportation
standards, monitor energy conservation in industry more closely,
and apply insulation standards and energy saving building codes
more effectively.1 0
Because of the considerable lead time involved in developing
alternative sources of energy, it seems especially important for
the IEA to move ahead with a sense of urgency on joint energy
development and research projects. However, the specifics of any
such projects are still under negotiation and discussion in IEA,
and IEA member countries generally seem to be adopting a cau-
tious approach in this area. In the United States most of the
major oil companies reportedly have invested in alternative
sources of energy such as coal, uranium, and geothermal and solar
energy. 12' However, to some members of Congress, this informa-
tion supports the contention that these oil companies already are
too big and should be divested of retail gasoline outlets and any
energy activities not dealing with oil. The oil companies' argu-
ment against such forced divestiture to date have been successful
in blocking legislation requiring divestiture, but the mere pres-
ence of such proposals may have served to limit investments in
alternative energy sources.
A major reason for the failure of the IEA to fulfill its goals of
energy conservation and the development of alternative sources
119. The lEA recently reported that in terms of the ratio of total primary energy use to
gross national product (GNP), the United States and other major industrial countries
failed to cut their consumption of energy over the 1973 to 1975 period. N.Y. Times, Nov.
2, 1976, at 38, col. 4.
120. The United States and some other lEA member countries need to adopt energy
saving measures that price energy at world levels, introduce effective automobile and
other transportation standards, monitor energy conservation in industry more closely, and
apply insulation standards and energy-saving building codes more effectively. N.Y.
Times, Nov. 2, 1976, at 38, col. 4.
121. N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 1976, at 51, col. 2.
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of energy is that contending factions in the United States have
not agreed yet upon a national energy policy. Indeed, the one
thing that the disputants seem to agree on is that the United
States' actions on energy matters have been "disastrous."'," This
conclusion is strongly supported by a few salient statistics. For
example, as of December 5, 1976, in the three post-embargo years,
United States domestic crude oil production had fallen off 8.8
percent. Oil imports over the last three years had increased
thirty-five percent, and had reached the point where they met
forty-three percent of domestic demand, as compared with thirty-
eight percent in late 1973. The annual cost of these imports had
risen to $25 billion a year.'23
It is beyond the scope of this article to explore in any detail the
various issues that have arisen in the domestic debate over en-
ergy. Although most experts call for a sharp increase in the price
of gasoline to induce conservation and investment in alternative
sources of energy, others argue that prices already are high
enough.2 4 Still others, although a distinct minority, suggest that
the United States and the other industrialized countries simply
learn to live with imported oil. They argue that energy independ-
ence is unattainable, that for the next two to three decades the
industrialized countries will be dependent upon OPEC for their
energy needs, and that talk of energy independence is counter-
productive to the establishment of a mutually satisfactory inter-
dependence between the industrialized countries and OPEC.2 5
The last position is, of course, inconsistent with the goals of the
IEA's Long-Term Cooperation on Energy Program, since these
goals are based on the premise that the industrialized countries
122. N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 1976, at 1, col. 5.
123. Kansas City Star, Dec. 5, 1976, at D2, col. 1.
124. See generally N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 1976, at 1, col. 5.
125. MALLAKH, The Energy Relationship Between the Arab World and the United
States: Conflict or Cooperation?, reprinted in M. BASSIOUNI, ISSUES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN
61 (1975). Accepting energy dependence and learning to live with imported oil is inconsist-
ent with the goals of the IEA's Long-Term Cooperation on Energy Program, which is based
on the premise that the industrialized countries need to lessen their dependence on OPEC
oil in order to eliminate OPEC's oligopolistic control over energy prices. Moreover, it
generally is agreed that in the early part of the next century, the world production of oil
will begin to decline and conflict between nations competing for natural resources will
result if alternative sources of energy are not available. Thus, the need for industrialized
countries to conserve energy and develop alternative sources of energy is substantial.
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need to decrease their dependence on OPEC oil in order to elimi-
nate OPEC's oligopolistic control over energy prices. Moreover,
it is generally agreed that by early next century, the world pro-
duction of oil will begin to decline; if alternative sources of energy
are not available, there may be sharp and perhaps violent compe-
tition among nations for natural resources. Thus, even if OPEC
did not exist, there seems to be a substantial need for the indus-
trialized countries to conserve energy and to develop alternative
sources of energy.
The success of the IEA's programs on energy conservation and
the development of alternative sources of energy depends on im-
plementation by member countries. The record to date, at both
the national and international levels, has been disappointing.
Vigorous steps, especially by the United States which consumes
approximately thirty-five percent of the world's oil energy, are
required if the goals of the International Energy Program are to
be realized. In the absence of effective energy conservation and
alternative sources of energy, the cost to IEA member countries
of the high price of oil is especially severe in terms of balance of
payment difficulties. Here, too, there has been a failure to imple-
ment a program designed to deal with the problem. Congress'
refusal to adopt implementing legislation appears to have
blocked the establishment of the Financial Support Fund envis-
aged by the OECD agreement. It is unclear whether alternative
sources of financing, such as the private international banks or
the International Monetary Fund, will be able to carry the bur-
den.
Beyond the IEP: Toward a World Wide Approach to Interna-
tional Cooperation on Energy
Even assuming full implementation of the International En-
ergy Program by IEA member countries, the question remains as
to what steps, if any, might be taken at the Conference on Inter-
national Cooperation or at other forums to achieve world-wide
control of energy. The International Energy Program, after all, is
a limited endeavor involving a small, although economically sig-
nificant, percentage of the world community. No global system
of international cooperation on energy matters yet is in sight.
The issues which must be resolved before such a global system
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can become a reality are manifold and multifaceted. They in-
clude access to supply, indexation, recycling of petrodollars,
sanctity of contract, and security of supply and prices. The mag-
nitude and complexity of these issues militates against haste in
adopting simplistic solutions.
Some elements of the International Energy Program, however,
could serve as a model for a cooperative, world-wide program of
energy management, with adjustments made in individual situa-
tions. For example, the IEA system for emergency reserve com-
mitments, demand restraints, and oil-sharing arrangements
might be adaptable in part on a global basis. Of course, much
would depend on whether the emergency reserve and demand
restraint commitments were either waived for the developing
countries or coupled with economic assistance to enable the de-
veloping countries to fulfill them. Oil-sharing arrangements, in
particular, might serve to mitigate the adverse effects of energy
shortages or supply bottlenecks.
Similarly, there appears to be a large degree of mutual interest
in a program of long-term energy cooperation along the lines of
the IEA model. Conservation of energy, development of alterna-
tive energy sources, and research and development on energy
matters might be pursued on a world-wide cooperative basis.
Clearly, a global exchange of information and technical assis-
tance on energy seems desirable. The development of a global
program also might be in the larger interest of OPEC members,
especially if they were actively involved in both the formulation
and implementation of the program and could be assured of an
equitable return on their investment.
With the OECD's Financial Support Fund inoperative, it
seems especially important that consultations be held between
IEA member countries and the OPEC surplus countries regarding
additional contributions to the IMF's General Agreement to Bor-
row. From all indications, there is an immediate need to make
additional funds available to countries in danger of defaulting on
their debts. Consultation also might be held among IEA mem-
bers, the oil producing countries, and the Third World oil import-
ing countries with a view to developing instrumentalities for post-
poning and refinancing debt. Such steps, of course, should be
contingent upon agreement by the deficit countries to make the
adjustments necessary in their economies to correct their external
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financial difficulties.
Finally, the research program of the IEA concerning energy
sources might serve to stimulate the world community to conduct
a deeper inquiry into the possibility of a major restructuring of
domestic economies so as to make them less energy intensive. The
world community should inquire into the feasibility of moving
toward new kinds of production based on greater decentraliza-
tion, smaller production units, and low-energy technologies. In a
world characterized by scarcity, not only in energy but also in
many other basic resources, such an inquiry is long overdue.
CONCLUSION
The International Energy Program provides a framework
within which participating countries may, through conservation
measures and the development of alternative sources of energy,
protect themselves against an oil shortage and predatory price
fixing by OPEC countries. However, the provisions of the IEP are
not self-executing. Further, the record of the participating coun-
tries, especially that of the United States, in carrying out these
steps, has been disappointing. Unless the participating countries
are willing to make the often politically difficult decisions to
implement the IEP at the domestic level, the promise of the
Program will remain unfilled.
Moreover, the International Energy Program basically is a
mechanism for international cooperation among the industri-
alized countries. Its provisions on relations with the oil produc-
ing countries and the developing oil importing countries are
largely hortatory. Little or no progress on energy issues was made
at the Conference on International Economic Cooperation.
This is unfortunate because the so-called energy crisis is global
in dimension and will be alleviated only through cooperative ef-
forts on a global level. Accordingly, future progress at the Confer-
ence on International Economic Cooperation will determine
whether the International Energy Program proves to be a catalyst
for true "international" cooperation on energy issues or merely a
source of further tension among members of the world com-
munity.
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